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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
did violence to the English language by attributing meanings to the
provisions in total disregard for the words of the provisions. It seems
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was more interested in up-
holding traditional political science principles in regards to stable
constitutions, than in construing the constitution. Therefore, the
case was properly settled by the court in ruling the Reapportionment
Act of 1964 unconstitutional. The court should have gone no farther.
Consideration of the Pennsylvania Constitution was wholly unwar-
ranted in view of the well-established doctrine of avoiding constitu-
tional issues whenever possible. Furthermore, the court, after as-
suming this unnecessary task, came to an unreasonable conclusion.
If the court had to decide the validity of these sections of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, it should have ruled them unconstitutional
under any reasonable interpretation of the English language.
ANDREW M. SCHIFINO
DENNIS GERARD LONG
CONFLICT OF LAws-Transfer under section 1404 (a) of Judicial Code,
a 1404 (a) transfer from one federal court in one jurisdiction to
federal court in another jurisdiction is a mere change of courtrooms,
with law to be applied by what the first federal court would apply.
Van Dusen v. Barrach, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
The Supreme Court in the case of Van Dusen v. Barrach1 was pre-
sented with the problem of interpreting section 1404 (a) of the Judi-
cial Code. 2 The personal representatives of victims of a Massachu-
setts airplane crash instituted wrongful death actions in the Federal
Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants moved
to transfer the action under section 1404 (a) to the Federal Court in
the District of Massachusetts. The Pennsylvania District Court
granted the motion, even though the personal representatives had
not qualified to sue in Massachusetts. This Court held that the
transfer was justified irrespective of which state's substantive and
conflict of law rules would control.3 Plaintiffs sought a writ of
1. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
2. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).
3. Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, 204 F. Supp. 426 (1962).
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mandamus restraining the transfer. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania District Court was with-
out jurisdiction to transfer. The Court of Appeals stated that Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 17(b) required that the capacity of
representatives to sue shall be determined by the law of the state in
which the district court is held.5 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit refused to grant a section 1404 (a) transfer since plain-
tiff had not qualified to sue in Massachusetts and therefore Massa-
chusetts was not a district where the action might have been brought.
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg
reversed, defining the phrase "where it might have been brought" in
section 1404(a) as applicable only to federal law, not the law of
the transferee state. 6 Interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
17(b) the Court held the law of the transferor forum is the appli-
cable law in order to meet the "interest of justice" requirement of
section 1404 (a).7 The case was then remanded to the Pennsylvania
District Court so that the court could reconsider whether the trans-
fer was justified under the additional guidelines laid down by the
Supreme Court.
The first portion of the Court's opinion defines and limits the pre-
existing law as formulated in Hoffman v. Blaski.8 Hoffman refused a
section 1404 (a) transfer because the requirement of venue and per-
sonal jurisdiction could not be met in the transferee district and
therefore such district was not one where the action might have been
brought. Hoffman left unanswered whether the transferee state
laws would affect transfer which Van Dusen answered. The Court
held that federal laws delimiting the district in which an action may
be brought shall be the factor considered in determining whether
the action might have been brought and other factors having refer-
4. Barrach v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (1962).
5. Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.: "Capacity to
Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a
representative capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his
domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined
by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district
court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association,
which has no such capacity by the law of such state may sue or be sued in its
common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be
sued in a court of the United States is governed by Title 28 U.S.C. Section 754
and 959(a)." [Emphasis supplied]
6. Van Dusen v. Barrach, supra note 1 at 624.
7. Id. at 625.
8. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
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ence to transferee state law,9 such as lack of capacity to sue or
failure to qualify to do business. Therefore, inability to bring suit
in the transferee district shall not affect a court's determination in
regard to that limiting phrase of section 1404 (a). This view seems
consistent with the purpose of section 1404 (a) which is to prevent
waste of time, energy and money and still obtain a just result. 10
Under this holding the range of available transferee forums is
widened and therefore the possibility of reducing time, money and
energy increased.
The second portion of the Court's opinion concerning the state
law applicable when transfer is granted is limited to the factual
circumstances in Van Dusen. The Court specifically exempts from
consideration the problem of choice of law when the plaintiff makes
the motion to transfer, where the transferor state would have ap-
plied the doctrine of forum non conveniens 1 1 or where there are
constitutional problems involved in applying a different state's law. 1 2
The Court's holding that when the defendants seek transfer, the
transferee court is obligated to apply the law of the transferor forum
reduces a section 1404 (a) transfer to a change of courtroom from an
inconvenient to a convenient location.1 3 This is true because the
forum which plaintiff originally chose is the forum whose conflict
laws will determine what substantive law is applicable. The Court
states that while the Erie1 4 doctrine requires the federal courts to
apply the state law of the forum in which it is sitting, this is not to
be interpreted literally.1 5 What Erie sought was a substantial iden-
tity or uniformity between federal and state court results and the
fact that in most instances this result could be achieved by direct-
ing federal courts to apply the laws of the state "in which it sits"
9. Van Dusen v. Barrach, supra note 1.
10. Continental Grain v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
11. Van Dusen v. Barrach, supra note 1 at 639-40. "In so ruling, however,
we do not and need not consider whether in all cases Section 1404(a) would
require the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the transferee
state. We do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same con-
siderations would be given if a plaintiff sought a transfer under Section 1404(a)
or if it was contended that the transferor state would simply have dismissed
the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens."
12. Id. at 639, n. 41. We do not suggest that the application of transferor
state law is free from constitutional limitations. See note 20 infra.
13. Id. at 639.
14. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. Van Dusen v. Barrack, supra note 1 at 638. The Court quotes Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal
terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution
of judicial power between State and federal courts . .. .
[Vol. 3: p. 278
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should not obscure the fact that when applying this reasoning to a
section 1404(a) transfer, the critical identity to be maintained is
between the federal district court which decides the case and the
courts of the states in which the action was filed.16
In regard to the three areas previously mentioned, which the
Court excludes from the application of Van Dusen, each area presents
problems which the Court will have to resolve in subsequent litiga-
tion.
In the first unanswered area, i.e., where the plaintiff makes the
motion to transfer, the Court seems to imply that the plaintiff may
not be allowed to choose an inconvenient forum, for the sole pur-
pose of gaining a choice of law advantage and then after the action
is commenced move for a section 1404 (a) transfer and still retain
the advantage gained by his initial selection. The rationale behind
such a ruling might be that while a defendant ought not to be able to
resort to the transfer device to frustrate any choice of law advantage
which plaintiff might gain from the choice of forum the plaintiff in
turn ought not to retain the advantage when he requests transfer
since the transfer would be limited to a district in which plaintiff
could have originally instituted the action. 17 In such circumstances
the Court should consider why the action was not commenced in
the proposed transferee forum and if plaintiff cannot show an honest
mistake in selection, he should not be allowed to retain whatever ad-
vantage he acquired. If transfer is granted then the law of the
transferee forum should apply.' 8
The rationale for such a holding could well be that plaintiff in
making the motion to transfer wants the action tried in the trans-
feree forum. Since he could have originally instituted the action in
that forum, for purposes of determining the applicable law, it could
be assumed that he did initiate the action there. Such a holding
would not be contra to the Erie doctrine since Erie does not de-
termine what state law a federal court has to apply. Erie was a
formulation of a policy that the federal courts are not to apply and
formulate their own substantive law.
What law is applicable if the transferor's law cannot apply due to
a constitutional limitation? 1 9 The problem usually arises when the
16. Id. at 639.
17. The American Law Institute - Study of the Division of Juridiction
Between State and Federal Courts - Tentative Draft No. 2, p. 98 (1964).
18. Law of the transferee forum includes that forum conflict of law rules
so that the transferee's substantive law may or may not apply.
19. See Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co.,
292 U.S. 143 (1934) where the court held that it was a violation of due process
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transferor forum state has only slight contact with the litigation and
if its substantive law were applied such application would be con-
trary to the due process and/or full faith and credit clause of the
constitution. 20 When the forum law of the transferor cannot be
applied, the applicable law should be the transferee state law since
the transferee state would have substantial contacts with the litiga-
tion in order to qualify for the transfer. Therefore, there would be
no constitutional bar in the latter forum to the application of its
laws.
The final unanswered area is what law is applicable if the trans-
feror state would have dismissed the action if brought in the state
court on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court has
held "that a prior state court dismissal on the grounds of forum non
conveniens can never serve to divest a federal district judge of the
discretionary power vested in him by Congress to rule upon a mo-
tion to transfer under section 1404(a).21 This holding could be in-
terpreted to mean that a federal court can never dismiss an action
since Congress has provided a different remedy. 22 If that interpre-
tation is followed, adherence to the principle of Erie would require
that the transferee state law apply. This is true because if the state
court would have dismissed the action, the plaintiff would have to
begin again in a convenient forum with its law applying. In order
to adhere to the similarity of result which Erie requires, the law of
the transferee state must be the applicable law. If not, a different re-
sult could be reached in a federal court than in a state court a block
away. 2 3
for Mississippi to apply its law to alter the terms of a Tennessee insurance
contract when Mississippi's activities in connection with the contract were
"slight" and "casual", also Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Company, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska
Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Company, 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
20. It is interesting to note here that defendants contended that the full
faith and credit clause required Pennsylvania courts to follow all the terms of
the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act including Massachusetts limitation on
recovery. 376 U.S. at 629 n. 24. Although the Supreme Court did not express
an opinion on this contention the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Griffith v.
United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) held that Pennsylvania was not required
by the Constitution to recognize Massachusetts' $20,000 limit on damage. See
also Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 133 (1961).
21. Parsons v. Chesapeake and Ohio R.R., 375 U.S. 71, 73-74 (1963).
22. Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416, 418 (1956).
23. 60 YALE L. J., 537 (1951).
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Van Dusen explains some of the problems involved in section
1404 (a) but due to the infrequent litigation in the area, it may be
in the far distant future before these remaining problems are
answered.
JAMES KIRK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Civil Rights--Public Accommodations Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348
(1964).
On June 19, 1963, the late President Kennedy called for civil rights
legislation in a message to Congress to which he attached a proposed
bill. Its stated purpose was:
. . . to promote the general welfare, by eliminating dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin
in... public accommodations through the exercise by Con-
gress of the powers conferred upon it ... to enforce the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, to
regulate commerce among the several states, and to make
laws necessary and proper to execute the powers conferred
upon it by the Constitution.'
After a year of deliberation, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.2
TITLE H OF THE ACT - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMI-
NATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION 3 was attacked by the
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., as being unconstitutional. Plaintiff was
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The United
States counterclaimed for the Act's enforcement. The District Court 4
upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations section and
issued a permanent injunction on the counterclaim. The case came
1. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 351 (1964).
2. P.L. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6.
4. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga.
1964); under § 206(b) of the Act, the Attorney General made a request that
a court of three judges be convened to hear and determine the case.
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